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NON-PROFIT CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986)
INTRODUCTION
The first amendment' has historically protected political speech.2
The Supreme Court of the United States recently extended this first
amendment protection to cover corporate3 political speech on issues that
have no immediate connection to the corporation's profit-making goals.4
This decision illustrated the concern underlying two very different areas
of corporate political speech: speech concerning candidates and speech
concerning ballot issues.5 The threat of corporations using money to in-
fluence candidates has prompted federal and state legislatures to prohibit
corporations from engaging in this area of political speech.6 The possi-
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
2. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (the restriction on political speech that
results from election expenditure ceilings is intolerable under the first amendment). See also Note,
Corporate Speech On Political Issues: The First Amendment in Conflict with Democratic Ideals?,
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 445, 450 n.41.
3. Corporations are considered "persons" for constitutional purposes. Santa Clara County v.
Southern P. Ry., 118 U.S. 394, 395-96 (1889). As such, corporations have been deemed "citizens"
protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendment's of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522
(1898); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889). Corporations are also pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1938). Additionally, corporations have constitutional protection from
double jeopardy, United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), and unreasonable
searches and seizures, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-13 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353-54 (1977).
However, the Supreme Court has denied that corporations are persons for purposes of the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the Constitution, and has held that the "liberty" referred to in and
protected by the fourteenth amendment applies to natural persons only. Asbury Hosp. v. Cass
County, 326 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1945); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939); Western Turf Ass'n
v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255
(1906). Moreover, the Supreme Court has denied corporations a constitutional right to privacy,
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950), and has denied them a right against
self-incrimination, California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974).
4. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Supreme Court has stated that cam-
paign activity, including contributions and expenditures, is political speech under the first amend-
ment. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
5. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789 (risk of corruption perceived in corporate cases involving corporate
expenditures and political candidates did not exist in a vote on a public issue).
6. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1984 Supp.)
(held unconstitutional in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
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bility of corruption resulting from corporate spending on ballot issues,
however, is considered more remote.
7
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc. ,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a
non-profit corporation's printing and distribution of newsletters urging
voters to vote for pro-life candidates and listing the various candidates'
positions on abortion issues were not prohibited expenditures under sec-
tion 441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 9 The First Circuit ad-
dressed two issues in reaching this holding. The court found that the
expenditures by the non-profit corporation on its newsletter were encom-
passed by the provisions of section 44 1b. 10 This section precluded corpo-
rate expenditures in connection with federal elections.'t However, the
court held that application of the act would impermissibly restrict the
corporations' right to free speech in violation of the first amendment.' 2
This case comment will focus on the First Circuit's opinion in
MCFL. It will first examine the statutes and litigation generated by the
corporate political speech issue. The MCFL decision will then be dis-
cussed. Finally, this comment will establish that the First Circuit was
correct in finding that section 441b encompasses expenditures in connec-
7. C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978) ("When corporations
seek to influence the electorate and not an individual candidate or party, no such state interest [in
preventing corruption] exists because corporate activities cannot create political debts .. "). The
Ninth Circuit went further and held that even if a corporation's involvement in a referendum influ-
enced voting, that is not sufficient reason to restrict corporate speech. Id.
8. 769 F.2d 13 (lst Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986) [hereinafter MCFL].
9. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
Section 441b reads, in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for... any corporation whatever... to make a contribution or expendi-
ture in connection with any election at which . . . a Senator or Representative in, or a
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with
any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of
the foregoing offices.... (b)(2) For purposes of this section ... the term "contribution or
expenditure" shall include any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, de-
posit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value ... to any candidate, campaign
committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any of the
offices referred to in this section, but shall not include (A) communications by a corpora-
tion to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families...
(B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its
stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families... and (C) the
establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated
fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership
organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock.
Id., quoted in MCFL, 769 F.2d at 15-16.
10. MCFL, 769 F.2d 13, 20. This portion of the First Circuit's holding reversed the lower
court's ruling on the same issue. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,
589 F. Supp. 646, 650 (D. Mass. 1984).
11. 769 F.2d at 15.
12. Id. at 23.
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tion with federal elections, and that the MCFL case is consistent with
both section 441b and with previous caselaw.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Election Laws
In 1905 President Roosevelt called for a law forbidding corporations
from contributing to political committees.13 Congress responded to this
call in 1907 by passing the Tillman Act. ' 4 This act made it unlawful "for
any national bank or any corporation... to make a money contribution
in connection with any election to any political office."' 5 In 1916, this
prohibition on political speech was upheld in United States v. US. Brew-
ers Association.16 The two major issues before the court were whether
Congress had authority to enact the Tillman Act and whether the Act
violated the first amendment's guarantee of free speech. ' 7 The court held
that Congress did have the authority to pass the statute as a regulation of
federal elections.' 8 The court then rejected the defendants' contention
that the statute abridged their right to free speech and press. ' 9
Nine years later, Congress passed the first version of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).20 The FCPA extended the Tillman Act
to prohibit any kind of contribution by a corporation in connection with
federal elections. 2' This act was in turn amended by the Taft-Hartley
Act.22 The Taft-Hartley Act extended the statutory prohibitions to in-
clude expenditures as well as contributions.
23
13. 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905).
14. Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (later codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 610).
15. Id. at ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 865.
16. 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916). This was the only case to arise under the Tillman Act prior to
amendments.
17. Id. at 167-69.
18. Id. at 167-68.
19. Id. at 169.
20. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, §§ 301-19, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (current
version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
21. Id. § 313, 43 Stat. at 1074. Specifically, the FCPA revised the amounts candidates could
spend for House and Senate elections to $2,500 and $10,000, respectively. The FCPA also expanded
the definition of "money" used in the Tillman Act to include "in kind" contributions. Id. § 302, 43
Stat. at 1070-7 1. This legislation contained many loopholes, however. For example, this first version
of the FCPA did not require candidates to report contributions or expenditures in federal elections.
Additionally, candidates were able to circumvent spending ceilings by diverting contributions into
separate committees. Federal law did not require these separate committees (or "PACs") to report.
Note, Political Action Committees and the Supreme Court, 12 W. ST. U.L. REV. 281, 283 (1984).
For a further discussion of PACs, see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
22. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947).
23. Id The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act reflects Congress' desire to regulate both
money contributions and "in kind" expenditures:
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These prohibitions on expenditures and contributions were further
clarified by the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) in 1971.24 FECA combined two approaches to election reform.
First, FECA set a ceiling on the amount a federal candidate could spend
on media. Second, FECA required full disclosure of campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures.25 This act also exempted certain types of spend-
ing. 26  FECA was further amended in 1976. At that time the anti-
corporate contribution section of the FCPA27 was repealed and incorpo-
rated into FECA, where it became section 441b.28 This section of FECA
was drafted for two purposes. The first purpose was to prevent corpora-
tions from securing political debts from politicians through contribu-
tions. The second purpose of section 441b was to protect corporate
shareholders from having their funds contributed by the corporation to
candidates that the shareholders did not support.
29
The intent and purpose of the provision of the act prohibiting any corporation ... [from]
making any contribution in connection with any election would be wholly defeated if it
were assumed that the term "making any contribution" related only to the donating of
money directly to a candidate and excluded the vast expenditures of money in . . . his
behalf ....
H.R. REP. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1947), quoted in MCFL, 769 F.2d at 18. During
further debate on the Taft-Hartley Act, Senator Taft observed that the term "expenditure" would
include "any advertisement or newspaper published for political purposes by a union or corpora-
tion." Id.
24. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (cur-
rent version at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1982)).
25. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1982).
26. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 9-10 (1971).
The most important exemption to be encompassed in FECA was the exemption for segregated funds
(also known as political action committees or PACs). The 1971 FECA allowed the use of corporate
monies for the establishment of a separate fund to be used for political purposes.
The legality of these segregated funds was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972). In this case the Court held that corpora-
tions could make unlimited contributions to a separate fund if the contributions were made volunta-
rily and if the political purpose of the fund was made clear to the contributors. 407 U.S. at 427.
The number of PACs now exceeds more than 3,500. The amount of money which is handled by
these PACs has risen from $12.5 million in 1974 to approximately $83.6 million in 1982. Among the
largest PACs in existence are United Auto Workers ($1,628,347 in funds) and the National Associa-
tion of Realtors ($2,115,135 in funds). See generally Note, supra note 21, at 285, 87.
27. See supra note 20.
28. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, § 316 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1982)).
29. Democratic Party v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797, 821
(E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nor. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Con-
servative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985). The court in National Conservative PAC
described the purpose of § 441b as follows:
The first purpose of § 441b ... is to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed
by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be
converted into political "war chests" which could be used to incur political debts from
legislators who are aided by the contributions. . .. The second purpose of the provisions
S. . is to protect the individuals who have paid money into a corporation ... for purposes
other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political
candidates to whom they may be opposed.
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Protection of Corporate Political Speech
Corporate political speech in the United States commenced in the
early 1800's.30 Until recently, however, there was no clear rule that cor-
porate political speech was protected by the first amendment.31 In the
interim, the closest that the Supreme Court came to a rule on corporate
political speech was its holding in Grosjean v. American Press Co. 32 In
Grosjean, the Supreme Court invalidated a state licensing tax on publish-
ers of newspapers. 33 This case was not a clear ruling on corporate polit-
ical speech rights, however. The Court did not base its holding on a
recognition of free speech rights held by corporations. Instead, the
Supreme Court based its decision on the fourteenth amendment and due
process. 34  Additionally, Grosjean involved the rights of newspapers.
Newspapers are considered media corporations which are more deserv-
ing of first amendment protection than ordinary business corporations. 35
Although this absence of conclusive Supreme Court holdings36 on the
issue of corporate political speech continued, some lower courts in the
1970's did recognize first amendment protection for corporate speech. 37
The first Supreme Court recognition of first amendment protection
for corporate political speech came in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti.38 In Bellotti, several corporations challenged the constitutional-
ity of a Massachusetts statute which prohibited expenditures by business
578 F. Supp. at 821.
30. Prentice, Consolidated Edison and Bellotti. First Amendment Protection of Corporate
Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599, 603 (1981). In the early 1800's the Supreme Court expressed its views on
the nature of corporations in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
("A corporation is an artificial being ... existing only in contemplation of the law.").
31. See Prentice, supra note 30, at 603.
32. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
33. Id. at 250-51.
34. Id. at 251.
35. See Prentice, supra note 30, at 603. Three years later in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939),
Justice Stone stated that corporations do not enjoy a right to first amendment protection of their
political speech. 307 U.S. at 527 (Stone, J., concurring). Read together, the opinions in CIO and
Grosjean seem to indicate that only corporations possessing free press rights would be accorded free
speech rights. See Prentice, supra note 30, at 603-04.
36. As early as 1965, at least one commentator stated that corporate political speech was pro-
tected by the first amendment. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1191, 1193 (1965). This conclusion stemmed from various Supreme Court holdings that ex-
tended protection of corporate political activities. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (Court established a political activity exception to
Sherman Act); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 621-24 (1954) (Supreme Court limited appli-
cation of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act to direct communications with members of
Congress).
37. See Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1334 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Borough of Coll-
ingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 362-64, 331 A.2d 262, 270 (1975).
38. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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corporations in state referendum proposals. 39 The state court had fo-
cused on whether the corporation had first amendment protection for its
political speech.4° That court upheld the statute.41 The Supreme Court
shifted this focus to the content of the speech rather than the identity of
the speaker. 42 The Court concluded that the content of the speech at
issue merited first amendment protection. 43 The corporations were al-
lowed to make expenditures in connection with the referendum.
44
A more recent Supreme Court recognition of first amendment pro-
tection for corporate political speech came in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Commission.45 This case involved a challenge to a New
York regulatory commission's restriction on the mailing by public utili-
ties of bill inserts which discussed issues such as nuclear energy.46 The
Supreme Court again struck down the ban as an impermissible restric-
tion of free speech.47 The Court indicated, as it did in Bellotti,48 that first
amendment protection of corporate political speech continued to be
based upon the rights of the receiver of the speech rather than on a cor-
poration's right to speak.
49
39. Id. at 768-69.
40. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 783, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1269
(1977), rev'd sub nor. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
41. Id. at 784, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
42. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777. The Supreme Court analogized to the "right to receive" doctrine
that it established in its commercial speech cases. See Note, supra note 2, at 447-50. In Bellotti, the
Court established a basis for protecting corporate political speech upon this doctrine. Because the
message itself merited first amendment protection, the Court felt that the source of the speech was
irrelevant. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
43. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. The Court, however, did not address the question of whether
different circumstances would justify a restriction on the political speech of a corporation which
would be impermissible if applied to an individual. Id. at 777-78.
44. Id. at 795. Two justices filed dissenting opinions. Justice White disagreed with the major-
ity's rejection of the government interests underlying the Massachusetts statute. Justice White found
sufficient evidence in the record to support the state's interest in restricting corporate domination of
the electoral process. Id. at 810-12 (White, J., dissenting). He also agreed with the state's desire to
protect minority shareholders from forced support of political views which they did not share. Id. at
812-18. Justice White made three major points with respect to corporate political speech. First, he
argued that corporate speech does not merit the same protection as individual speech because it
cannot be considered self-expression. Id. at 807. Second, Justice White stated that corporations
should be subject to the regulations of the state that created them. These regulations could include
restrictions on speech. Id. at 809. Finally, he criticized the majority for substituting its judgement
for that of the Massachusetts legislature. Id. at 804.
Justice Rehnquist also dissented. He argued that corporations are only entitled to protection of
commercial speech incidental to the business of the commercial corporation. Id. at 822-28 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist argued that corporate political speech that did not pertain to mat-
ters having a material effect on its business should not be protected. Id.
45. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
46. Id. at 532-33.
47. Id. at 544.
48. 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
49. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 533-34. In this case as in
Bellotti, the Supreme Court established the rights of corporations under the first amendment. The
164
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Recently, in MCFL,50 the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit addressed issues underlying restrictions on the political
speech of a non-profit corporation. The MCFL court focused on two of
these issues. First, the First Circuit considered whether expenditures by
a non-profit corporation on a newsletter which urged readers to vote for
pro-life candidates were encompassed by section 441b. Second, the
MCFL court considered whether application of section 441b to the non-
profit corporation's expenditures would infringe on the corporation's first
amendment rights.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL) is a non-profit corpo-
ration organized "to foster respect for human life and to defend the right
to life to all human beings, born and unborn, through education, political
and other forms of activities." 5 1 MCFL had been publishing a newsletter
expressing its views for several years.52 In 1978, MCFL published a
"Special Election Edition" newsletter to coincide with a primary election
involving candidates for the House and Senate. 53 This "Special Election
Edition" listed all of the candidates in the election as well as their posi-
tions on three pro-life issues.54 The special edition also urged readers to
vote consistently with MCFL's pro-life views, and it carried only the pic-
tures of those candidates who supported this pro-life position.
55
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit against
MCFL for violating section 441b. 56 The complaint sought a civil penalty
of $5,000.57 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgement. 58
Court, however, has clearly established two caveats to these rights. First, the first amendment rights
of corporations are based upon the rights of the receivers to hear the speech. The Court has not yet
recognized a right to political speech residing in the corporate speaker. Second, the Court has not
said that a government could never show a state interest sufficient to overcome this protection of
corporate political speech. See Prentice, supra note 30, at 620.
50. 769 F.2d 13 (1985).
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. The newsletter was published three times in 1973, five times in 1974, eight times in 1975
and in 1976, five times in 1977, and four times in 1978. Id. at 15 n.1.
53. MCFL had published these "special election editions" for previous elections. Id. at 15.
54. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 646, 648
(D. Mass. 1984). The three issues were a constitutional human life amendment, legislation to pro-
hibit the use of tax funds for abortions, and legislation to provide positive alternatives to abortions.
Id.
55. Id. The special edition did carry a disclaimer stating that it did not "represent an endorse-
ment of any particular candidate." Id.
56. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
57. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 646, 647
n. I (D. Mass. 1984). After the FEC brought this suit, MCFL established a segregated fund or PAC
pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(c), which exempts such segregated funds from prohibition under
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The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
granted MCFL's motion on three grounds. First, the court held that the
special election edition did not constitute an "expenditure" within the
meaning of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1982). 59 The court also held that the
editions were exempted from the prohibition against expenditures under
a provision of the act which exempts "any news story, commentary or
editorial distributed through.., any ... newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical." 60 Finally, the court ruled that applying section 441b to pro-
hibit MCFL's expenditures for the special election edition would consti-
tute a violation of the non-profit corporation's rights to free speech,
press, and association. 6'
In 1985 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
heard MCFL. 62 The First Circuit focused on two issues. The first issue
the MCFL court focused on was whether expenditures by MCFL on a
newsletter urging readers to vote for pro-life candidates in a federal elec-
tion were encompassed by section 441b of FECA. The second issue was
whether application of the prohibitions found in section 441b would vio-
late the non-profit corporation's first amendment rights.
REASONING OF THE COURT
The First Circuit began its opinion by examining the issue of
whether expenditures by MCFL on a special election newsletter were en-
compassed by section 441b. 63 The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts had maintained that MCFL's expenditures on
the newsletter were not intended by Congress to be covered by section
441b. 64 The district court supported this contention by noting that the
special election edition was exempted from the act's prohibition against
expenditures. 65 The First Circuit, however, in a three part analysis re-
jected the district court's holding that section 441b did not encompass
the special election edition.
66
The first part of the MCFL court's analysis focused on the language
the act. The action was not thereby rendered moot, however, because the FEC sought the civil
penalty of $5,000. 589 F. Supp. 646, 647 n.l.
58. 589 F. Supp. 647-48.
59. Id. at 649-50.
60. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(9)(B)(i) (1982), quoted in 589 F. Supp. 646, 650 (1984).
61. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 16.
62. 769 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
63. Id. at 17.
64. 589 F. Supp. at 649.
65. Id. at 650.
66. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 16-22.
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of section 441b.67 The MCFL court concluded that this language indi-
cated a congressional intent that activities, other than direct payments to
candidates, can also be considered contributions or expenditures under
section 441b(2). 6 8 Accordingly, the MCFL court rejected the district
court's holding that MCFL's special edition was not an expenditure pro-
hibited by section 441b.69 The second section of the MCFL court's anal-
ysis focused on the issue of whether the legislative history of section 441b
and its predecessors supported an interpretation of "expenditure" that
could include the special edition.70 The court found that the legislative
history reflected Congress' early decision to include indirect expenditures
in the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibitions. 71 Furthermore, the legislative his-
tory revealed Congress' intent to include special election editions of
union or corporate newsletters in the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibited ex-
penditures provision. 72 The MCFL court also noted that this intent of
Congress had been substantiated in case law. 73 Thus, the MCFL court
held that MCFL's expenditures in connection with its special election
edition were intended by Congress to be included in section 441b.
74
67. Id. at 16-17.
68. Id. at 17. The MCFL court first noted that the language of § 441b included direct or indi-
rect payments of various types to "any candidate, campaign committee, or political party ... in
connection with any election" in the term "contribution or expenditure." 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2),
quoted in MCFL, 769 F.2d at 16. The court then observed that the general definitions section of the
act gave a broader interpretation to the term "expenditure" than the one found in § 441b(b)(2):
"any purchase, payment.... or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing
any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (1982), quoted in MCFL, 769 F.2d at 16.
The FEC contended that the broader § 431 definition of expenditure should apply. 769 F.2d at 16-
17. The First Circuit focused on the effect of the word "includes" in the act and concluded that
"expenditures" under the act include but are not limited to payments to candidates, campaign com-
mittees or political organizations. 769 F.2d at 17.
69. 769 F.2d at 21-22.
70. Id. at 17-20.
71. Id. at 18. The court examined a report by a House Committee which concluded that ex-
penditures besides direct contributions to candidates should be included in the Taft-Hartley Act.
The committee stated that this was necessary to avoid "wholly defeat[ing]" the purpose of the Act.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1947)).
72. Id. at 18-19. The MCFL court focused on statements of Senator Taft, a co-sponsor of the
Taft-Hartley Act, in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 18 (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 6436-37 (1947)).
73. 769 F.2d at 19. In United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957), the Supreme Court
held that a union's expenditures for televised political advertisements violated the Taft-Hartley Act's
prohibition against corporate or labor expenditures in connection with a federal election. UAW, 352
U.S. at 592. The Court ruled that Congress added the term "expenditure" to the Act in order to
embrace indirect campaign contributions. The UAW Court also noted that Congress' intent was to
prohibit the use of corporate or union funds to influence the public to vote for a particular candidate
or party. 352 U.S. at 585-87.
74. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 20. The court noted that § 441b would encompass the special edition
even if § 441b required "express advocacy" as defined in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52
(1972) (express words of advocacy include terms such as "vote for," "defeat," "support," "elect,"
etc.). 769 F.2d at 20. The MCFL court stated that the special election edition expressly advocated
the election of pro-life candidates only and it reminded readers that "your vote in the primary will
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In the final section of the MCFL court's analysis, the court consid-
ered the issue of whether the special edition fell within the act's exemp-
tion for periodical publications. 75 Rejecting the district court's holding
that the special election edition was exempt,76 the MCFL court held that
the characteristics of the special election edition were not such as would
constitute newspapers, magazines, or periodical publications within the
meaning of the statutory exemption. 77 The MCFL court therefore con-
cluded that the special election editions were encompassed by the section
441b definition of expenditure. 78
The second issue addressed by the First Circuit was whether section
441b, as applied to the special election edition, amounted to an infringe-
ment on MCFL's freedom of speech. 79 The MCFL court observed that
section 441b was a "content-based restriction" of expression8 0 and, as
such, the application of the act could only be justified by a substantial
government interest.8 ' The court noted that the government interest in
preventing corruption through the creation of political debt was not pres-
ent in the instant case.8 2 Because MCFL's expenditures were indirect
and uncoordinated with the federal election or with the candidates, the
MCFL court held that the FEC could not show any compelling govern-
ment interest in prohibiting the expenditures.8 3 The MCFL court there-
fore concluded that the application of section 441b to MCFL's
make the critical difference in electing pro-life candidates." 769 F.2d at 20. This constituted express
advocacy of identified candidates.
75. 769 F.2d at 21-22. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982) exempts from the act "any news story,
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any.., newspaper, magazine or other
periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political
committee, or candidate." 769 F.2d at 20.
76. 769 F.2d at 21-22.
77. Id. The MCFL court noted that the special editions were printed sporadically and con-
tained no masthead, printed volume number, or issue number.
78. Id. at 21-22.
79. Id. at 22. The district court had concluded that application of § 441b to the special edition
violated MCFL's first amendment rights. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D. Mass. 1984).
80. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 22. The MCFL court defined a "content-based restriction" as a restric-
tion on the "political content of the publications" as opposed to a restriction on the "time, place, or
manner of expression." Id.
81. Id. Before ruling on the presence of a substantial government interest, the court, rejected
the FEC's argument that § 441b did not absolutely prohibit corporations from engaging in political
advocacy and thus did not affect MCFL's first amendment rights. Id. The court noted that the
availability of alternate methods of funding speech (i.e., establish a PAC) did not justify the elimina-
tion of "the simplest method." Id.
82. 769 F.2d at 23. MCFL did not contribute directly to a political candidate. Furthermore,
MCFL's contributors need not be protected from unwanted expenditures because those contributors




expenditures violated MCFL's first amendment rights.84
ANALYSIS
While the MCFL decision cannot be read as extending unlimited
first amendment protection to non-profit corporations, the MCFL court
did recognize a first amendment protection of corporate political
speech.8 5 The First Circuit, however, implicitly restricted this non-profit
corporation's political speech by giving section 441b a broader interpre-
tation.8 6 The MCFL court correctly decided both of these issues.
The Scope of Section 441b
The first section of the MCFL court's analysis focused on the lan-
guage of section 441b.87 The court correctly observed that the language
of section 441b encompassed more than direct payments to a candidate,
campaign committee, or business organization.8 8 This construction of
section 441b is supported by the use in the act of the word "includes. '8 9
The presence of the word "includes" in a statute usually signifies a legis-
lative intent to encompass other items not specifically listed in a statute.90
According to their ordinary meaning, the words of section 441b do not
limit the act to direct contributions only.91 Rather, the words indicate
that the statute encompasses any purchases, payments, gifts of money, or
other allocations made "for the purpose of influencing" any federal
election. 92
Further evidence in support of the MCFL court's conclusion that
section 441b encompasses such expenditures can be found in the legisla-
tive history of section 441b.93 This legislative history illustrates Con-
gress' recognition that the statutory term "expenditure" would include
any political advertisement or newspaper published by a corporation. 94
84. Id.
85. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
87. 769 F.2d at 16-17.
88. Id. at 17.
89. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(a)(i) (1982); 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (1982).
90. 769 F.2d at 17 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION 133 (4th ed. 1984)). See also United States v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 614
F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1980).
91. 769 F.2d at 17.
92. Id. at 16.
93. Id. at 17-20.
94. Id. at 18. During congressional debates on the Taft-Hartley Act, Senator Taft stated: "we
have long prohibited corporations from contributing money for political purposes, and it was always
supposed that the law prevented a corporation from operating newspapers for that purpose or adver-
tising in newspapers for that purpose." 93 CONG. REC. 6436 (1947).
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Moreover, Congress intended this interpretation of "expenditure" to re-
main the same after the amendment of the statute in 1971. 95
The MCFL court's interpretation of the scope of section 441b is also
supported by relevant case law. For instance, in United States v. UAW,
9 6
the Supreme Court held that an expenditure of union dues for televised
political advertisements violated the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibition
against corporate or union expenditures. 97 The defendant union used its
general treasury funds to pay for television broadcasts which endorsed
selected candidates for Congress.9" The Court examined the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act and concluded that the union's expendi-
ture was exactly the type of "indirect contribution" that the act was
meant to prohibit.99 Moreover, in Common Cause v. Schmitt,t°° the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia referred to sec-
tion 441b in order to interpret the term "expenditure" as found in the
Presidential Campaign Fund Act. 10 1 The Federal Election Commission
had alleged that various groups of Ronald Reagan supporters had
planned to exceed the expenditure limits of the statute. 10 2 Guided by
section 441b, the court interpreted "expenditure" broadly to include in-
direct expenditures as well as expenditures authorized by the candi-
date.103 The district court thereby found the groups' planned
expenditures to be within the meaning of the statute.1°4
Finally, the MCFL court's decision to look to the intent of Congress
and to the facts of the case in defining the scope of section 441b is consis-
tent with the approach other courts have taken. For example, in United
States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,10 5 the defendant union
published an in-house newsletter which urged union members to vote for
a particular candidate.'0 6 The Supreme Court ruled that Congress did
95. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 20. In 1971, Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10, to clarify the statutory prohibitions on contribu-
tions and expenditures. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. The MCFL court observed
that "nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress meant to narrow the prohibition of
expenditures 'in connection with' a federal election by the 1971 [amendment]." 769 F.2d at 20.
96. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
97. Id. at 586-87.
98. Id. at 584.
99. Id. at 585.
100. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
101. See Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 492 (1980) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f)(1)
(1976)).
102. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. at 490.
103. Id. at 492-93.
104. Id. at 493.
105. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
106. Id. at 108.
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not intend to prohibit this type of publication.10 7 The Court then held
that the statute 0 8 did not reach such a use of corporate or union
funds. ' 09
Thus, the MCFL court properly included the special election edition
in the meaning of the term "expenditure" found in section 441b. The
language of the act, the act's legislative history, and relevant caselaw sup-
port the court's interpretation. Additionally, the First Circuit's use of
the facts of the case and of legislative intent was consistent with the ap-
proaches other courts have taken in defining the scope of section 441b.
The First Amendment Issue
The second issue examined by the MCFL court was whether the
application of section 441b of FECA to MCFL's special election edition
constituted a violation of the non-profit corporation's first amendment
rights. 10 The MCFL court correctly held that the corporation's indirect
expenditures in connection with the special edition were protected under
the first amendment and could not be prohibited under section 441b.I t
This interpretation of a non-profit corporation's right to political speech
is correct because of three elements in the case.
First, the MCFL court's decision is correct because the government
interest in preventing corrupt solicitation for contributions" t2 does not
apply to non-profit corporations. Non-profit corporations are organized
by its members to express a particular ideology or to fulfill a function
that all members agree upon. " 3 Unlike for-profit corporations organized
primarily to pursue direct economic gain, non-profit corporations would
seem to have little purpose for coercing its members into making contri-
butions to candidates or political campaigns that the non-profit corpora-
tions's members do not support." 4 Moreover, the risk that the money of
contributors will go to support candidates they oppose is remote because
the ideology of non-profit corporations is generally clear to all potential
107. Id. at 123-24.
108. The Court was construing the scope of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368,
§§ 301-19, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b). See Congress ofIndu. Org&,
335 U.S. at 112-24.
109. 335 U.S. at 123-24.
110. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 22-23.
111. Id. at 23.
112. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
113. For example, the founders of MCFL organized this non-profit corporation around a polit-
ical ideology: the need to educate voters on the pro-life position. 769 F.2d at 15.
114. See National Conservative PAC, 578 F. Supp. 797, 821 n.34. See also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
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contributors."l 5 The protection of these potential contributors is one of
the underlying purposes of section 441b."16  Non-profit corporations
don't have the same degree of economic interest in election of candidates
that for-profit corporations have. Accordingly, non-profit corporations
do not have the same potential for corruption and for nondisclosure that
for-profit corporations have. Therefore, the government interest in
preventing corruption does not apply, and the government would not be
justified in restricting the non-profit corporation's political speech under
section 441b.
The second element that justifies the MCFL court's conclusion is
that the MCFL case involved indirect, uncoordinated expenditures."1
7
These expenditures do not create the possibility of large corporate con-
tributors securing a political debt from a candidate.1 8 In fact, such ex-
penditures provide little direct help to a political candidates' campaign
and may even have adverse effects.'1 9 As a result, the primary effect of
limiting indirect expenditures is to restrict the quantity of campaign
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates.' 20 The MCFL court also
correctly recognized that the government has diminished interest in regu-
lating indirect, uncoordinated expenditures.' 2' The First Circuit thereby
concluded that the government interest in the application of section 441b
to MCFL's expenditures was insufficient to justify violation of the corpo-
ration's first amendment rights.'
22
Finally, MCFL involved a non-profit corporation's indirect expendi-
tures in connection with one issue of a federal election, as opposed to a
solicitation for direct contributions to candidates.1 23 These indirect ex-
penditures at issue in MCFL are analagous to expenditures in connection
with ballot issues. The MCFL court implicitly observed that both indi-
rect and issue-based expenditures do not involve direct contributions to a
particular candidate.' 24 Therefore, neither indirect nor issue-based ex-
115. National Conservative PAC, 578 F. Supp. at 821.
116. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
117. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 23.
118. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1976).
119. Id. at 47. This effect of expenditures was cited by the court in Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 646, 649 (D. Mass. 1984) ("[the publication]
probably lessened rather than enhanced the prospects of election of candidates subscribing to defend-
ants' platform which, according to public opinion polls, is opposed by most citizens").
120. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39.
121. MCFL, 769 F.2d at 23.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. This observation is supported by the language of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 47:
The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or
his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also allevi-
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penditures involves the risk of corruption perceived in cases involving
for-profit corporations or direct contributions.12 5  Consequently, the
MCFL court correctly ruled that the right of the non-profit corporation
to speak freely under the first amendment greatly outweighed the govern-
ment's interest in preventing corruption in elections through the use of
the prohibitions found in section 441b.
These three elements parallel the legal history leading up to the
MCFL decision. First, non-profit corporations are not as susceptible to
the risk of coercive contributions to undisclosed political candidates as
are for-profit business corporations.1 26 Second, indirect and uncoordi-
nated expenditures in connection with distributions of material to the
general public are permissible activities.1 27 Finally, non-profit corpora-
tions should be able to engage in any form of protected political speech in
connection with election issues because the compelling governmental in-
terest in preventing corruption is not a factor.' 2 These three elements
also represent the MCFL fact pattern: a non-profit corporation makes
indirect, uncoordinated expenditures in order to speak out on an election
issue, albeit in the context of a federal election. 29 The MCFL decision
thus embodies the development of law in this area.
The MCFL decision is not, however, likely to clarify this law or
explain past interpretations courts have given to section 441b and first
amendment rights of corporations. 130 First amendment protection of cor-
porate speech will remain controversial. '31 However, the MCFL decision
ates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commit-
ments from the candidate.
125. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978). An important
distinction between Bellotti and Buckley revolved around the government interest in preventing cor-
ruption. The Court stated that the risk of corruption stemming from direct contributions to political
candidates did not exist in a popular vote on a public issue. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
126. National Conservative PAC, 578 F. Supp. 797, 821 n.34. See also supra notes 112-16 and
accompanying text.
127. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92.
128. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
129. See Note, Federal Election Law. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life: Non-Profit Cor-
poration Expenditures in Federal Elections, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 138, 146 (1984).
130. One observer has labeled such decisions "anti-democratic" and "part of the backlash
against the spread of the franchise and other aspects of mass democracy." Miller, On Politics, De-
mocracy, and the First Amendment: A Commentary on First National Bank v. Bellotti, 38 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 21, 35 (1981). Another commentator has charged that decisions giving corporations
protection under the first amendment create an artificial opposition between liberty and political
equality. Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Polit-
ical Equity?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
131. This controversy is evidenced by the positions taken by the justices of the Supreme Court.
In Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, the majority decision was five to four. Because Justice Blackmun was in
the Bellotti majority but dissented in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 548 (1980), five out of the nine Supreme Court justices have opposed first amendment protec-
tion of corporate speech.
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establishes that section 44 1b language will allow a case-by-case interpre-
tation of that section's application.1 32 Indeed, a case-by-case application
of section 441b is necessary because a literal reading of section 441b
would probably result in the section's being struck down as unconstitu-
tional. Flexibility in its application thus allows courts to avoid invalida-
tion of section 44 lb. t 33 (If such a literal reading of section 441 b had been
the correct approach, courts would have taken it by now.1 34)
CONCLUSION
In MCFL, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
addressed two issues regarding a non-profit corporation's expenditures in
connection with a federal election: 1) whether the expenditures by the
non-profit corporation for its special election edition newsletter were en-
compassed by the provisions of section 441b; and 2) whether application
of section 441b to the expenditures would violate the corporation's first
amendment rights. The MCFL court correctly held the section 441b did
encompass the expenditures in question. The court reached this conclu-
sion after an examination of section 441b's language and legislative his-
tory. Additionally, the MCFL court correctly held that the non-profit
corporation's first amendment rights would be violated by an application
of section 441b's prohibitions to MCFL's expenditures made in connec-
tion with the special election edition newsletter. The court properly
ruled that there was no government interest sufficient to outweigh the
corporation's first amendment rights.
DAVID ROCKLIN
132. Section 441b prohibits "any corporation whatever" from making expenditures in connec-
tion with an election. See supra note 9.
133. Courts generally do not anticipate questions of constitutional law before it becomes neces-
sary to decide them. Federal Election Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately
Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring)).
134. Note, supra note 129, at 147-48.
